

# CREATING SPACES FOR PEACE :

## A Comparative Overview of Zones of Peace

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The stunning events of 1989-91 have inaugurated a new era in international relations. From the Yalta Summit of 1945 to the Malta Summit of 1989 the world was dominated by the Cold War. Since Malta, a new order has been emerging. (Galtung, 1991) This order is however very fragile. It can easily break down as it already has in many places, including the Persian Gulf, former Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Other protracted conflict areas such as the Korean Peninsula and the Indian-Pakistani border also are at risk. The Cold War was characterized by a balance of nuclear terror between the super-powers leading to a precarious peace. The universalist ideological pretensions of the Cold War have now been replaced by rising ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts. With the increasing proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons into the hands of smaller states, the threats to international peace and security may have in fact increased rather than decreased. The new cold wars between North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, the Arabs and Israelis (to name just a few) can erupt into full-scale wars of incalculable costs.

To usher in a period of durable peace, therefore, the new world requires a new paradigm to understand an increasingly interdependent and vulnerable world system. (Tehranian, forthcoming) The emerging paradigm calls for planetary consciousness, global responsibility, and world citizenship. In place of the outmoded ideologies of capitalism, communism, and non-alignment which divided the world into first, second,

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and third worlds, the new paradigm must recognize at least the following three conditions: (1) the essential unity of the world when confronted by nuclear or ecological disasters such as the Three-Mile Island, Chermobyl, Exxon-Valdez, the burning of over 600 Kuwaiti oil wells, and the green-house effect, (2) the mounting divisions of the world between the centers and peripheries of power as reflected in the gender, religious, ethnic, and nationalist conflicts, and (3) the urgent need for new principles and methods economic progress.

The idea of zones of peace (ZOP) offers one such opportunity for restructuring the world system from confrontation to cooperation. It is an old idea whose time has come. In fact, it promises to turn into a grassroots movement in which governments will have to respect the demands to their citizens for new peace zones. According to Elise Boulding (1991), the number of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) has increased from 250 in 1982 to 5000 in 1991. There are already 24 countries in the world which have unilaterally declared themselves as NWFZs. There are also 5 formal NWFZ treaties signed among governments.

Broadly speaking, a ZOP may be defined as (1) a well-defined territory or region in which the parties at dispute commit themselves to non-violent and pacific settlement of their conflicts by total or partial disarmament and through binding adjudication, arbitration, or mediation procedures, (2) with a governing authority consisting of the governments or parties at dispute over that territory under the supervision of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, (3) with a land authority for the development of a free economic zone among the members and other interested parties acquiring "peace bonds" with commercial rates of return, and (4) in instances of protracted ethnic conflict, with a culturally homogenous majority gearanteeing hower the civil and human rights of the ethnic or religious minorities residing in the zone.

this essay will provide a brief introduction to the history of the idea, its philosophical underpinnings, and some policy issues facing its development and implementation. However, the richness and diversity of the concept and its varieties of actual and potential practice require more research and longer expositions.

## History

Zones of peace are as old as history itself. Religious sanctuaries and secular zones of neutrality have historically provided some respite from the brutality of violence. In modern times, some countries such as Switzerland, Austria, and Cost Rica also have declared their neutrality in regional or world conflicts. It is remarkable that these protestations of neutrality by relatively small powers have been in some special instances respected by the great powers leading, in effect, to the creation of new peace zones. ZOPs may thus serve very practical purposes for all parties at conflict, including sanctuary as well as a haven for spies, banking services for the rich, and prosperity for the hosts.

In the post-war period, the idea has found its greatest advocates among those powers with the greatest to lose from protracted conflict. The non-aligned movement, launched by Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Chou En-lai, and Tito at the Bandung Conference of 1955, sought to avoid the costs of entanglement with the Cold War through a doctrine of neutrality and peaceful co-existence. The moral authority of this movement as well as the worldwide peace movement, however, came from the practice of nonviolent resistance led by such figures as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Bishop Tutu. Although ZOPs need not be fully committed to non-violence, many proponents of the idea believe in the Gandhian principles of Satyagraha and non-violent resistance against any form of oppression.

In more recent years, the idea of peace zones has been proposed by a number of scholars and activists, including Johan Galtung, Bishop Antonio Fortich, Edna Fuerth Lemle, Cheju International Council in Korea, and Dalai Lama. Johan Galtung has proposed it for Palestine. Bishop Fortich and his co-workers have, in fact, successfully established a number of peace zones in the Philippines. The Filipino zones of peace are civilian-initiated demilitarized areas created to allow noncombatants to establish homes and economic bases without the fear of becoming caught in the cross-fire between the military and the rebels. The communities define geographic areas where neither rebels nor government forces may enter. Inhabitants practice strict nonviolence, maintain their infrastructure of roads, bridges and schools, and form peacekeeping forces that monitor the presence of strangers. Edna Lemle has pursued this idea with the British and Argentine governments for a peaceful

settlement of the Falkland/Maldives Islands conflict. The Cheju International Council is proposing to turn the island into a zone of peace for the reconciliation of North and South Korea. Most recently, Dalai Lama has called for the establishment of a zone of peace based on non-violence in Tibet within the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China. In these two latter cases, the issue of sovereignty assumes an importance secondary to the practice of non-violence and cooperation.

The idea and practice of ZOPs has historically gone through four stages, from sanctuaries to specific purpose, general purpose, and empowering peace zones. In the first stage, religious sanctions predominated. The ancient Polynesians had a practice of "puuhonua" or place of refuge, where wrong-doers were forgiven. (Lopez-Reyes, 1991) The ancient Israelites had Cities of Refuge and Sabbaths. The Christian world in the Middle Ages knew about the "Truce of God" and the "Peace of God." Islam divides the world into a zone of peace (Dar al-Islam) and a zone of war (Dar al Harb); it also considers the mosque as a zone of peace to which the combatants could take refuge.

In the second stage of their development, ZOPs have evolved into secular and functionally specific territories of peace. In modern history, diplomatic missions (embassies and consular offices) have served as the territorial extensions of the guest in the host country with a zone of peace immunity. Moreover, the Red Cross headquarters and vehicles in the midst of combat, the countries declaring themselves neutral in times of wars, and the nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) all have one feature in common. For specific times, places, and functions, certain designated territories might be considered as inviolable by the combatants or contestants. In the case of NWFZs, a ban is imposed on one particular weapon of mass destruction. The five NWFZ treaties encompass Antarctica, Outer Space, Latin America, International Seabed, and South Pacific. (For further details, see Boulding, 1991, Table 2.) A UN conference planned for 1992 in Colombo also is expected to declare the Indian Ocean a NWFZ.

The third stage of development of ZOPs is of more recent origin. The general-purpose zones of peace are often the result of years of peaceful social, economic, cultural, and political cooperation and integration, declared or undeclared. Since the

War of 1812, for instance, the US-Canadian border has been a general-purpose ZOP. Since 1945, The European Economic Community (EEC) also has become one such zone. Since its establishment in 1967, the ASEAN has similarly provided a general-purpose framework for peace, security, and cooperation among its member states in Southeast Asia. (Haas, 1991) With the worldwide movement toward regional cooperation and security arrangements, as exemplified by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), prospects for general-purpose ZOPs look encouraging.

The fourth stage of development of ZOPs, however, is of even greater promise. It indicates a deepening and broadening of the concept beyond the often limited acts of governments and towards citizen action and participation in the building of peace zones. That is why I am calling it a citizen empowering phase of the development of the concept. This phase ultimately points to a time that no one would show up to fight when and if governments declaring the Cheju Island as a zone of peace parallels the citizens' initiatives in many parts of Japan (1500 communities), the United States (168 such declarations of which 87 are legally binding), Canada (178) and Europe (nearly 2000) in unilateral declarations of their localities as nuclear weapons free zones. Twenty-four countries also have explicitly or implicitly prohibited nuclear weapons by national law, policy or constitution (Boulding, 1991, Table 1) In this respect, the story of Palau is most instructive. As of 1991, after 7 rounds of voting, the people of Palau have refused to give in to U.S. pressures for a change in their constitution which calls for a nuclear free zone in that country.

## Philosophy

Zones of peace philosophically depend on the doctrine of peace with peaceful means rather than peace through military strength. Although this doctrine has its roots in the great religious traditions, it has come into its own by the great non-violent struggles of this century. It has also achieved credibility and practical possibility by a distinct paradigm shift in international relations. World order has historically evolved from repressive, to hegemonic, to what may now be called communitarian.

(Tehrani, 1991b) All the imperial systems of the past, from the Persian to Greek, Roman, Arab, Mongol, Ottoman, French, German, Japanese, British, and American empires have been more or less repressive. They subjugated by force vast numbers of peoples in the peripheries to the will of a dominant center.

Eventually imperial rivalries among the great powers led to two devastating world wars in the 20th century. With the invention of weapons of mass destruction, war itself seemed to be an outmoded instrument of foreign policy. A new world order had to be invented. Under the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, the principle of collective security became the cornerstone of this new order. Another principle, that of unanimity among the Great Powers to act as the world policemen, became the guarantor of collective security. A third principle, pacific settlement of disputes, set forth the preferred method of conflict resolution except in cases of grave violations of international peace and security.

A hegemonic world had been thus born. Under the League and the U.N., the new world order recommended both force and persuasion, collective security arrangements as well as ideological debates and legal wranglings. This new order, however, proved still-born. Without Ethiopia by Mussolini, in 1935, and the failure of the League of Nations to act collectively against the aggressor, put the last nail on the coffin of that order. Similarly, the Cold War between the two superpowers following World War II left little opportunity for the UN Security Council to play its role as the world policeman.

With the demise of the Cold War, what are the chances for a peaceful new world order? Despite the disappointments of the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War, there is a new world consensus on the requirements for an enduring international peace and security. That consensus recognizes that enduring peace can come only out of a sense of community. Hence, the emerging world order may be called communitarian. Three elements seem essential to the construction of an effective world community, including common interests, norms, and laws. ZOPs are perhaps the most effective method of achieving a sense of community underwritten by common interests, norms and laws. The development of regional common markets is taking on a new lease on life in 1992 when the EEC enters a new phase of monetary and political union. Other

regions of the world also are following suit. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has set the pace for the developing countries, a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is in the offing, and an Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) has been meeting to develop a Pacific community analogous to an Atlantic community.

There is a risk, of course, that these budding regional blocs would turn into intense economic competition and possible political and military confrontation rather than cooperation. However, an emerging consensus recognizes the need for the global protection of the environment, use of technology, trade, and development policies to overcome the gaps between the rich and the poor, universal application of human rights, and collective denunciation of the use of violence in national and international conflicts. (Boulding, 1988) The world community ultimately depends on a fragile moral community. Without solidifying these norms, it will be torn apart. ZOPs in all of their varieties can build these norms and networks more effectively than any other community of common interests, norms, and laws.

## Policy

There is no general agreement on how to define ZOPs. Nevertheless, issues of sovereignty, governance, and surveillance are the main policy problems facing them all. Sovereignty is perhaps the thorniest issue. The United Nations Charter recognizes the indivisible sovereignty of its member-states and forbids any direct interference in their internal affairs. However, the traditional notions of indivisible national sovereignty have been chipped away on both global and local fronts. On the global front, the rights of the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state on humanitarian or collective security grounds have now been established in international law (Nanda,1991; Newman,1991). The U.N.Security Council was willing to directly intervene in the internal affairs of post-war Iraq in the name of humanitarian interventions to save the Kurds and the Shi'ites from persecution. It also intervened on grounds of collective security to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons and rearmant plans. On the local front, the rights of municipal

governments to determine by popular referenda their own defense policies have received increasing popular recognition. Many municipalities in the United States and Europe have unilaterally declared themselves nuclear weapons free zones; some in the U.S. have even established their own offices of Municipal Foreign Policy. The U.S. Federal Government, however, considers decisions dealing with defense and foreign policy within its own jurisdiction. It does not generally recognize any authority for municipal or even state governments in such matters.

National sovereignty has been further undermined both practically and theoretically by other developments. Practically, some new telecommunication technologies such as global satellite surveillance, direct broadcast satellites (DBS), electronic cash transfers, and transborder data flows have effectively limited national government control of national borders. (Tehrani,1990) Theoretically, notions of transnational as opposed to national sovereignty had provided the basis for the U.N. Trusteeship over former colonial territories. As I have argued elsewhere (Tehrani,1991a), the concept of trusteeship can be now extended in order to establish ZOPs in situations of protracted conflict such as Kurdistan, Palestine, Kashmir, or Croatia. In these cases, a ZOP may be defined as (1) a transnational entity whose sovereignty resides in a UN or any other appropriate internationally sponsored Board of Trustees consisting of the governments or parties at dispute over a territory, (2) a global land authority for the development of a free economic zone among the members and other interested parties acquiring "peace bonds" with commercial rates of return, and (3) to the extent possible, culturally homogeneous zones for the ethnically disenfranchised majorities but with strict guarantees of human rights for the ethnic or religious minorities residing in the zone.

The above political, economic, and cultural requirements leave considerable room for the negotiation of details in order to achieve positive rather than negative or zero-sum games for the parties at conflict. The plan aims at making peace profitable to all sides. By resolving protracted conflicts in a peaceful way, clearly all parties win more security. By entering into a common market or establishing a free trade zone, the participating governments and populations win in economic prosperity. By giving autonomy and status to disenfranchised ethnic groups, the entire world wins in the



achievement of greater human rights and international harmony. In the case of Kurdistan, for instance, none of the states presently controlling the Kurdish population is willing to grant independence. All of them may be willing, however, to recognize the cultural autonomy of the Kurds under a plan that puts them in control (as members of the UN Board of Trustees) while attracting millions of dollars for a cooperative development of the region.

Even if the issue of sovereignty is resolved satisfactorily, the problem of governance of peace zones presents the next most important policy dilemma. How to give *de facto* powers sufficient incentive in the governance of ZOPs in order to elicit their recognition of the *de jure* status of ZOPs as zones of partial or general disarmament? The answer to this question depends on the functional and spatial scopes of ZOPs.

Table 1 provides a schematic typology of ZOPs based on their spatial scope (local, provincial, national, regional, or global) and functional parameters (sanctuaries, specific purpose, general purpose, and empowering). As demonstrated by the examples, the governance problems of each of these types is uniquely different. Holy sites and diplomatic missions (consular offices and embassies) have been historically treated as inviolable zones of peace. One of the latest examples of this was when General Noriega took refuge to the Vatican Embassy in Panama and could not be captured until he negotiated his surrender to the U.S. authorities.

The NWFZs have been declared either unilaterally or negotiated into treaty agreements among a number of states. The general-purpose ZOPs are best represented by those world regions such as the EEC and ASEAN which have achieved durable peace and security through long-term social, economic, cultural, and political cooperation. The empowering ZOPs are essentially of two kinds, top-down or bottom-up. The top-down variety is best represented by the postwar UN trusteeship system in which the former colonial powers were put in charge of a territory for the purpose of preparing it for self-government. The bottom-up variety is best represented by citizens' initiatives in North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia-Pacific for the establishment of NWFZs in their own localities. The initiatives by the Cheju Islanders or Falkland Islanders represent yet another popular effort to turn their land into zones of peace for reconciliation between the parties at conflict, namely North and South

Korea and Argentina and Britain.

Table 1. A Typology of Zones of Peace Matrix of Spatial and Functional Scopes

SPATIAL SCOPE :	Local	Provincial	National	Regional	Global
Functional Scope :					
Sanctuaries	Holy sites	Holy sites	Holy sites	Holy sites	Holy sites
Specific Purpose	Embassies	Embassies	Embassies	Embassies	Embassies
ZOPs	NWFZ	NWFZ	NWFZ	NWFZ	NWFZ
General Purpose	Counties & City	Provinces	Countries	Oceans, World regions	Earth, Outer Space
ZOPs		Cheju	US-Canada	ASEAN,	
Empowering ZOPs		Falk and/Maldive	Border	EEC	
		Arens of conflict or reconciliation, e.g. Kurdistan, Palestine, Falkinands	UN Trust territories		
		Cheju Islands			

The ultimate success of a peace zone largely depends on the degree of mutual trust it generates and the extent of mutual benefits it bestows. Problems of surveillance and inspection are central to both outcomes. Open flows of information and communication so that the parties to the agreement can, in fact, monitor the progress of the situation is therefore essential to the entire enterprise. Under conditions in which a high degree of trust already exists, such as democratic municipalities declaring themselves as NWFZs, internal monitoring systems suffice. But when this level of trust does not exist or mutual suspicions run high, inter-governmental or trans national monitoring agencies are essential. Ultimately, those peace zones succeed which bestow transnational benefits upon their inhabitants without providing a threat to the outside world. EEC and ASEAN are the two prime examples.

### Conclusion

This essay has provided a brief introduction to the evolution of and prospects for zones of peace. It also has argued that in the post-Cold War era, a new

communitarian paradigm in international relations is creating a social movement for ZOPs. The normative principles of this paradigm call for a ban on weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical, and high tech "star wars"), pacific settlement of all disputes, development of economic communities, and ultimately a ban on all forms of violence from the face of the earth.

In the absence of the universalist ideological retentions of the Cold War, however, a resurgence of ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts threatens the fragile foundations of the new paradigm. ZOPs provide an effective, incremental method for dealing with these threats. They build the communities of affinity needed for the development of communities of interest. To mobilize public opinion in this direction, there is a need for the establishment of a network among the 5000 already established ZOPs spread around the world. A zone of peace network (ZOPNET) could provide channels of communication for information sharing, problem solving, and public education. It would be in keeping with the aims of this conference to take the initiative for the information of such an international network.

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## 평화지대에 대한 비교론적 고찰

마지드 테레니안

1989년 말타회담 이후 대두된 신질서는 아직은 취약하다. 그 이유는 소련과 유고의 민족 문제, 남북한과 인도-파키스탄, 아랍-이스라엘간의 대립, 핵무기와 화학무기의 확산 등 많은 갈등요인들이 도처에 깔려 있기 때문이다.

상호의존적이고 취약한 신세계질서를 이해하기 위해서는 세계시민으로서의 범지구적인 의식과 책임감을 수반하는 새로운 패러다임이 요구된다. 이 패러다임은 1) 핵이라든가 생화학 적 파괴의 위협에 놓여있는 세계가 기본적으로 통합되어 있다는 점과, 2) 중심과 주변간의 격차가 더욱 심화되어 가고 있다는 점, 그리고 3) 평화와 협력이 가능한 절차와 수단이 필요하다는 점을 인식하는 위에서 마련되어야 한다.

평화지대의 개념은 세계체제를 대결로부터 협력으로 재조정할 수 있는 기회를 제공한다. 평화지대와 관련한 사례와 운동은 종교의 성전에서 많이 찾아볼 수 있고, 스위스와 오스트리아와 같은 정치적 중립국의 형태로, 그리고 네루, 수카르노, 닛세르 등이 주창한 비동맹 운동을 통해서 나타나곤 했다. 최근 안토니오 호르티히주교가 주도하는 필리핀 평화지대화 운동, 제주국제협의회 평화의 섬 운동, 그리고 달라이 라마의 티벳 평화지대화 운동으로 나타나고 있다.

평화지대는 군사적 힘을 통한 평화가 아니라 평화적 수단을 통한 평화라는 개념에 근거하고 있다. 이러한 평화지대의 실현 가능성은 세계질서가 억압적인 것으로부터 패권적인 것으로 그리고 지금은 상호의존적인 공동사회로 변모하여 가고 있다는 측면에서 찾아볼 수 있다. 그리고 평화지대안은 공토의 이해관계와 규범, 법에 의해 공동사회라 불리우는 신세계 질서를 건설해 나갈 수 있는 가장 효율적인 수단이다.

평화지대안은 주권의 신성불가침이라는 원칙 보다는 인도주의와 집단안보의 견지에서 국제공동체의 개입권한을 인정해야 한다는 데에 근거하고 있다. 평화지대안은 주권 문제 이외에도 평화지대의 법적인 지위를 인정해 주기 위해서 사실상의 권력으로 하여금 평화지대를 관리하도록 하는 충분한 유인을 어떻게 제공할 것인가 하는 것도 쉬운 문제는 아니다. 이는 기능적 영역과 공간적 영역으로 나누어서 해결의 실마리를 찾아야 할 것이다.

평화지대안의 성공은 상호신뢰와 상호이익의 정도에 의존한다. 이를 위해서는 갈등요인에 대한 철저한 조사-감독을 통해서 평화적 해결의 가능성을 높이고 정보의 개방과 평화교육을 통해서 평화에 대한 인식을 제고시키는 것도 필요하다.